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ASSOCIATIONS-FRATERNAL SOCIETIES-INJUNCTION RESTRAINING UNAU-
THORIZED USE OF NADIE.-The plaintiff, a society known as the Supreme
Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose, having the advantage of prior
organization, sought to enjoin the defendant from calling itself the In-
dependent, Benevolent and Protective Order of Moose. Held, although not
organized for profit, the plaintiff may have the unfair use of its name
enjoined, to protect its property rights. Supreme Lodge of the World,
Loyal Order of Moose v. Independent, Benevolent and Protective Order of
Moose (1925, N.J. Eq.) 131 Atl. 219.
It is now well settled that equity will enjoin the unauthorized use of
trade names because, it is said, a business or pecuniary interest is in-
volved. Marshall Engine Co. v. New Marshall Engine Co. (1909) 203
Mass. 410, 89 N. E. 548. In contrast is the unsuccessful attempt of an
individual to enjoin the use of his surname, which did not get beyond the
court of first instance. Cabot v. Kabotchnik, reported in the New York
Times for Aug. 16, 1923, p. 14, col. 5. To clubs and purely social organiza-
tions, however, the courts have been ready to extend the same protection
in the use of their names as is accorded to business associations. Grand
Lodge K. P. v. Grand Lodge (1911) 174 Ala. 395, 56 So. 963; Benevolent
and Protective Order of Elks v. Improved Benevolent and Protective Order
of Elks of the World (1912) 205 N. Y. 459, 98 N. E. 756. It is said that
the reasons for such relief are the same as those for protecting trade
names. State ex rel. Great Am. Home Say. Inst. v. Lee (1921) 288 Mo.
679, 233 S. W. 20. Thus it is said that the relief is given to prevent a
fraud on the public. Knights of Maccabees of the World v. Searle (1905)
75 Neb. 285, 106 N. W. 448; see Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v.
Improved Order Knights of Pythias (1897) 113 Mich. 133, 137, 71 N. W.
470, 471. Or, as in the instant case, to protect some "property right".
Grand Lodge K. P. v. Grand Lodge, supra. Insistence on these grounds
for relief is probably explained by the traditional idea that equity acts only
to prevent fraud or to protect a property right. Cf. Chappell v. Stewart
(1896) 82 Md. 323, 33 Atl. 542. But in these cases the notion of fraud
on the public seems somewhat fanciful, for the public would ordinarily
suffer no damage, if the unauthorized use of the club name were not
restrained. The only effect would be that the public would erroneously
regard the defendant organization as a part of the plaintiff organization.
Cf. Schechter, Historical Foundations of Trade Mark Law (1925) 5. The
annoyance of the plaintiff is generally the only result. While these or-
ganizations ordinarily have physical property the value of which may be
remotely threatened, it is submitted that the protection of such property
is only incidental and that to rest relief on such a ground is to stress the
non-essential. It is the delectus personarum, on which depend its repute
and standing in the community, that the plaintiff is interested in having
protected. The privilege of choice of membership is well settled. Mayer
v. Journeymen Stone Cutters (1890) 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 At. 492. But
this privilege would be practically nugatory if the rejected persons were
privileged to masquerade before the public as members of the rejecting
organization. Thus to accord such organizations rights in rem against
the unauthorized use of their names is a natural development. If, how-
ever, what the court is really protecting is the repute and standing of the
organization and not some property right, it would seem better frankly
to put these cases on that ground.
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BILS AND NOTES-PAoL EvnnzNcE-INDIvirnAL RErSF'0N.SIDIL1TY OF
OFFICERS ON CORPORATE NoTE.-The plaintiff sued the officer. of a corpora-
tion on a promissory note signed by them, each signature being followed
by the title of the corporate office held. The corporate name had been
stamped at top of the note, and the corporation seal affimed to the lower
left hand corner. Delivery was made by one of the signatories with the
statement that it was an individual note. The lower court found for the
plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed,
since the note was ambiguous; and whether it was corporate or individual
depended upon the disclosed intention with which it was delivered. Thyhbr
v. Fluharty (1925, Idaho) 239 Pac. 1049.
Parol evidence will not be received to exonerate the agent where the
promissory note on its face is the undertaking of the agent only, no reference
being made on its face to his representative capacity. Too4 p. MeCaw t 1913)
74 Wash. 335, 133 Pac. 469 (holder against maker); Baird v. Publkdwr
Nat. Service Bureau (1924, N. D.) 199 N. W. 757 (payee against maher).
Nor to charge the agent where the note on its face is unmistakably the prin-
cipal's. Chatham Nat. Bank v. Gardner (1906) 31 Pa. Super. CL 135 (holder
against maker); St. Joseph Valley Bank v. Napoleon Motor. Co. 01925,
Mich.) 202 N. W. 933 (payee against makers); ef. Scanlan v. Kcith (1882)
102 IlM. 634 (payee against maker); Shaver v. Ocean Mining Co. (1862)
21 Calif. 45 (holder against maker). But what is "unmistakably" the
undertaking of agent or of principal has been a matter of uncertainty and
has not been settled by the Negotiable Instruments Law. COmximmTs (1918)
27 YAi. LAW JOURNAL, 686; see Schnl.ng v. Ervin (1918) 185 Iowa, 1, 11.
169 N. W. 686, 690; N. I. L., see. 20. Some cases have held the presence
of the corporation seal upon the note to be sufficient evidence of "unmis-
takable" corporate intent. Reed v. Fleming (1904) 209 Ill. 390, 70 N. E.
667 (payee against maker); contra: Dutton v. Marsh (1871) L. R. G Q. B.
361 (payee against maker); Daniel v. Glidden (1905) 38 Wash. 550, 80
Pac. 811 (payee against maker). But where the corporation name appear-
on the note and words indicating representative character, such as "agent",
"trustee", "treasurer", are added to the signatures, the note is generally
held "ambiguous" and parol evidence is admissible. Consuncr's Twinr
Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Thermo Tank Co. (1923) 196 Iowa, 04, 194 N. W. 290
(holder against maker); Jump v. Sparling (1914) 218 14ass. 324, 105
N. E. 878 (payee against maker). And on any "ambiguou3" note parol
evidence is also admitted where it is alleged that, to the knowledge of both
parties, there was an intent to make an obligation of the principal and
not of the agent, and that the note was given and accepted as such. RMordun
& Co. v. Thornsbury (1917) 178 Ky. 324, 198 S. W. 920 (payee against
maker) contra: Wurlitzer Co. v. Rossmann (1916) 196 Mo. App. 78, 190
S. W. 636 (payee against maker). Or, when properly alleged, to show
that, by a course of dealing between the parties, that form of execution
had been adopted as the obligation of the principal. Metcalf v. 11"lisam
(1881) 104 U. S. 93 (payee against maker). In general, as between one
of the original parties and a third party, such evidence is admissible where
the third party is not a bona fide holder for value and without notice.
See Metcalf v. Williams, supra. Or where the instrument bears sufficient
evidence upon its face and is so ambiguous as fairly to put a reasonable
man upon inquiry. Germania Nat. Bankd -v. Mariner (1906) 129 Wis. 544,
109 N. W. 574. The instant case is indicative of a tendency to extend the use
of parol evidence. But since, according to the testimony of the corporate
officers at the trial, it was their intention to avoid individual responsibility,
the unauthorized statements of one of the signatories in delivering the note
should not be sufficient to bind the others, although perhaps sufficient to
bind him personally. In the view of the instant holding, to prevent a note
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from being "ambiguous" it would seem to be practically necessary to use
the following form: "The X Corporation promises to pay . . ,
-(signed) The X Corporation, per A, President etc."
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-CROPS-LANDLORD'S LIEN AS SUBJECT OF MORT-
GAGE.-One Cottrell leased his land on a crop-share basis, obtaining a lion
for his rent under Comp. Code of Iowa, 1919, sec. 6502, but having no
right to possession of the crops. Cottrell mortgaged his rents and profits
of the leased land to the plaintiff who filed his petition for foreclosure.
But prior to this suit the defendant, judgment creditor of the landlord,
Cottrell, caused a levy to be made on Cottrell's share of the crops, still
unmatured. The lower court decided in favor of the plaintiff. Hold,
that the judgment be affirmed, on the ground that the plaintiff's lien on
the crop became effective on commencement of foreclosure proceedings,
whereas the judgment creditor obtained no "rights" by his levy. Rodgers
v. Oliver (1925, Iowa) 205 N. W. 513.
In absence of statute, there can be no valid legal mortgage of goods in
which the mortgagor has no "title". Moody v. Wright (1847, Mass.) 13
Metc. 17; Jones, Chattel Mortgages (5th ed. 1908) sec. 138. But in the
case of crops, whose seed has been sown, the mortgage is upheld on the
doctrine of "potential interest". Grantham v. Hawley (1616, K. B.) Hob.
132; Hall v. Glass (1899) 123 Calif. 500, 56 Pac. 336. And this is gen-
erally so in the case of unplanted crops. Dickey v. Waldo (1893) 97 Mich.
255, 56 N. W. 608; COMMENTS (1924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 175, note 1.
Although some states hold a mortgage of unplanted crops void at law,
they enforce a lien on the crop, when it comes into existence, through
equity proceedings, against all except bona fide purchasers for value.
Huysts v. Bell (1882) 72 Ala. 336; Kelly v. Goodwin (1901) 95 Me. 538, 50
Atl. 711; contra: Crine v. Tilts (1880) 65 Ga. 644; see State Bank V.
Grover (1923) 110 Neb. 421, 193 N. W. 765; (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 680;
but see Sporer v. McDermott (1903) 69 Neb. 533, 96 N. W. 232 (enforcing
an agreement to mortgage a crop on its coming into existence). In several
jurisdictions express legislation has been enacted to validate such mort-
gages. Word v. Cole (1916) 122 Ark. 457, 183 S. W. 757; contra: Minn.
Gen. Sts. 1894, sec. 4154 (prohibiting them). All courts are agreed that
the mortgagor need not be the sole owner of the crop, in order to make
a valid mortgage of his interest therein. Sunol v. Molloy (1883) 63 Calif.
369 (tenants in common). It has been held that a tenant can mortgage
his share of the crops, even though the landlord has all incidents of owner-
ship, subject to the future right, accruing in the tenant at the time of
maturity of the crops. Yates v. Kinney (1886) 19 Neb. 275, 27 N. W. 132;
see Hammock v. Creekmoore (1887) 48 Ark. 264, 3 S. W. 180. And the
court of the principal state, supported by decisions in at least two others,
has held it sufficient if the mortgagor, as in the instant case, has a mere
landlord's lien on the crop. Riddle v. Dow (1896) 98 Iowa, 7, 66 N. W.
1066; Potts v. Newell (1876) 22 Minn. 561; Howell v. Pugh (1882) 27 Kan.
702. Two other states have adopted what appears to be a contrary view.
Broughton v. Powell (1875) 52 Ala. 123 (changed by code); Orcutt v.
Moore (1881) 134 Mass. 48 (if the crop or its equivalent is to be paid as
rent). Three objections to these holdings were expressed in the dissenting
opinion in Riddle v. Dow, supra: (1) The lien of the landlord can not be
made the subject of a valid levy by a judgment creditor. Howard Co. v.
Kyte (1886) 69 Iowa, 307, 28 N. W. 609. It is argued that this is true in
the case of a mortgage. But in the case of an attachment the court is
considering the disability of the creditors to take physical possession of
the crop-an historically required formality of the law of attachment.
(2) The landlord cannot sue for an injury to the crop. Drake v. Chicago
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Ry. (1886) 70 Iowa, 59, 29 N. W. 804. But while certain legal relations
may be necessary to maintain an action for damages, it does not necez-
sarily follow that they are prerequisites to a valid mortgage. (3) The
lien, statutory and personal to the landlord, is not assignable. Block v.
Smith (1895) 61 Ark. 266, 32 S. W. 1070. This was deemed a fatal objec-
tion to the validity of a mortgage in Alabama before the code provision
permitting such assignment. Broughton v. Powell, supra; contra: Ballard
v. Mayfield (1895) 107 Ala. 396, 18 So. 29. Although Iowa has apparently
not decided this question, where the problem has been raised it has almost
universally been held that the assignee can recover in equity. NcItnma,
v. Greenville Bank (1889) 66 Bliss. 323, 5 So. 753. And a number of
statutes have been passed to the same effect. Biggs v. Piper (1888) 8
Tenn. 589, 8 S. W. 851. But even if the lien be held non-assignable, quacre
whether this should necessarily prevent the lien-holder from uzing his
interest to raise money by means of a mortgage. Cf. Stewart v. Powcra
(1893) 98 Calif. 514, 33 Pac. 486 (mortgage of homestead land held valid,
although the statute made all "assignments and transfers . . . null
and void"); Van Patten. v. Thompson (1887) 73 Iowa, 103, 34 N. W. 76"
(mortgage of debtor's property held valid, although same could not ba
"assigned" under solvency statute).
CONSTITUTIONAL .LAw-DuE PROCESS-ENFORCIENT OF COVENANT NlOr
TO CONVE= TO NEGROES.-Lots in a certain tract were sold subject to a cove-
nant that they should never be conveyed to negroes. The grantee of one
of these lots subsequently sought to sell to a negro, and the neighboring
grantees filed a bill against both parties to the sale for an injunction to
restrain conveyance. The injunction was granted pendente lite and the
defendants appealed on the ground, inter alia, that the negro was deprived,
without due process of law, of his "right" to acquire, own, and occupy land.
Held, that the decree be affirmed. Torrey v. Wolfes (1925, App. D. C.)
6 Fed. (2d) 702.
The privilege of acquiring property, it seems, is "property" within the
protection of the due process clause. See Holden r. Hardy (1897) 169
U. S. 366, 391, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 387; Bzchanan v. Warley (1917) 245 U. S.
60, 74, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 18. But covenants such as that in the instant caZ2
are the acts of individuals, and to the acts of individuals the fifth and
fourteenth amendments have no application. Civil Rights Case, (1833)
109 U. S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18. Of course, the individual's act of discrimina-
tion-the covenant-would be ineffective without the court's coSperation;
but this is likewise true in cases upholding an individual landowner's privi-
lege, even in the absence of restrictive covenants, to refuse to sell to a
negro. Keltner v. Harris (1917, Mo.) 196 S. W. 1; People r,. Fore.t Homea
Cen. Co. (1913) 258 Ill. 36, 101 N. E. 219. Judicial participation is
involved in every vindication of an individual's privilege to discriminat2
between persons, whether white or black, although it seems more real
where, as in the instant case, the vindication requires affirmative judicial
action. Such judicial participation, as distinguished from the individual's
acts that it vindicates, is subject to the due process clause, since that
clause applies to all state acts whether executive, legislative, or judicial.
Ex parte Virginia (1880) 100 U. S. 339. Due process, as applied to judi-
cial acts, is unquestionably satisfied where the adjudication is in accord
with settled rules of law. See United States v. Cruickshank (1875) 92
U. S. 542, 554. No question can, therefore, arise as to the constitutionality
of the enforcement in most states of such covenants as that here in question;
for in most states restraints on alienation to designated groups have
been enforced generally. See Jackson v. Schutz (1820, N. Y.) 18 Johns.
174, 184; Colwell v. Springs Co. (1879) 100 U. S. 55, 57; Gray, Restraint3
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on Alienation (2d ed. 1895) see. 41. Where constitutional objections hav
been raised, they have, with one exception, been overruled. Corrigan v,.
Buckley (1924, App. D. C.) 291 Fed. 899; Janss Inv. Co. v. Walden (1925,
Calif.) 239 Pac. 34; Parmalee v. Morris (1922) 218 Mich. 625, 188 N. W.
330; Koehler v. Rowlands (1918) 275 Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217; Quents-
borough Land Co. v. Cazeaux (1915) 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641; contra:
Gandolfo v. Hartman (1892, S. D. Calif.) 49 Fed. 181. In fact, non-enforce-
ment in such states would give the negro an immunity from the operation of
the law that would result in a want of due process as to any other persons
against whom restrictive covenants were enforced, since the classification
involved would be unreasonable. Cf. Parmale v. Morris, supra. In
states that have held void restraints to designated groups generally, their
enforcement against negroes might possibly be held unconstitutional. Cf.
Title G. & T. Co. v. Garratt (1919) 42 Calif. App. 152, 183 Pac. 470. For
while not every departure from settled rules constitutes a denial of due
process, the Supreme Court in the case supposed might perhaps ascribe
the departure to race prejudice which would be sufficient to make the
departure unconstitutional. Cf. Moore v. Dempsey (1923) 261 U. S. 86,,
43 Sup. Ct. 265; (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 82.
EVIDENC_-WAIVER OF RULE OF EVIDENCE BY CoMMITTFE OF LUNATIC
HELD VAYD.-In order to obtain the privilege to cross-examine the plaintiff,
the committee of a lunatic, by stipulation entered with the court's per-
mission, waived the provisions of the N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 347, renderingr
incompetent the plaintiff's testimony as to transactions with the lunatic.
The jury disagreed, and pending another trial the lunatic died. There-
upon, his administratrix, substituted as defendant, moved to vacate the
committee's stipulation. The motion was granted and the plaintiff ap-
pealed. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the order was erroneous, since
the administratrix, although not bound by the stipulation to permit the
plaintiff to testify, could not object to the reading in evidence of his testi-
mony at the former trial. Dean v. Halliburton (1925) 241 N. Y. 354, 150@
N. E. 141.
That a person sui juris can waive a rule of evidence is generally ad-
mitted. Wigmore, Contracts to Alter or Waive the Rules of Evidence
(1921) 16 ILL. L. REV. 87, 55 Am. L. Rnv. 823. Whether one acting in a
fiduciary capacity can do so would seem to admit of some doubt. That
an executor or administrator cannot waive the statute of non-claim or the
running of the statute of limitations is well settled. Ward v. Magaha
(1913) 71 Wash. 679, 129 Pac. 395; Rhodes v. Cannon (1914) 112 Ark. 6,
164 S..W. 752; McHugh v. Dowd's Estate (1891) 86 Mich. 412, 49 N. W.
216. And a trustee, by his conduct, cannot estop the cestui que trust.
Jenkinson v. New York Finance Co. (1911) 79 N. J. Eq. 247, 82 Atl. 36;"
Capell v. Winter [1907] 2 Ch. 376; contra: Lloyd's Banking Co. v. Joncs
[1885] 29 Ch. 221. Nor can fiduciaries bind their beneficiaries by their
admissions. First Nat. Bank v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank (1908)
171 Ind. 323, 86 N. E. 417 (trustee); Caulfield v. Green (1900) 73 Conn.
321, 47 Atl. 334 (executor); (1908) 7 MICH. L. REV. 75; contra: Knorr v.
Raymond (1884) 73 Ga. 749 (trustee, when part of res gestae). Some
courts have held that the compromise settlements of an executor or ad-
ministrator with claimants against the -estate of a decedent are binding.
Parker v. Providence & Stonington S. S. Co. (1891) 17 R. I. 376, 22 Atl.
284; Denny v. Parker (1894) 10 Wash. 218, 38 Pac. 1018; of. Ward if.
Magaha, supra (criticizing Denny v. Parker). But in such a case the
compromise may, in distinction from the acts in the other cases .Rupra, be
for the benefit of the estate. The introduction of a deposition taken by
an administrator from the opponent as to a transaction with the deceased
CASE NOTES 757
waives any objection to testimony by the opponent as to the transaction.
Ess v. Griffitk (1897) 139 Mlo. 322, 40 S. W. 930. And testimony by the
administrator or executor himself concerning such a transaction has the
same effect. N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 347; Minns v. Crossnzan (1922, Sup.
Ct. Spec. T.) 118 lisc. 70, 193 N. Y. Supp. 714. Objection, seasonably
made, is required of administrators and executors, as from others to effect
the exclusion of objectionable evidence. Barber v. Young (1897) 115
Mich. 100, 72 N. W. 1096; Quirt v,. Lloyd (1869) 41 N. Y. 349. A fortiorl,
the courts will permit an express waiver of a rule of evidence by the
personal representative. Wistum v. KLradwell (1920, C. C. A. 7th) 270
Fed. 546; McClenahan v. Keyes (1922) 188 Calif. 574, 206 Pac. 451. Thus,
although a fiduciary cannot waive substantive rights, the waiver of which
will surely prejudice the estate, there seems to be a different policy as
to procedural rights. The possibility of benefit is generally the nmotie
for waiving the latter. This possibility, it seems, is reason enough for
permitting the waiver. If the fiduciary acts negligently, or wilfully abuvss
his discretion in this regard, the beneficiaries may proceed against him
personally for their protection. Bogert, T-rzvsts (1921) 477.
FRADu--MEASunE OF DASALGrs--DiFFERENCE BErwENs REPnzssr.snZ-
VALUE AND AcrU.L V.L- .- The defendant induced the plaintiff to pur-
chase a garage business by means of fraudulent misrepresentations. The
plaintiff recovered judgment for the fraudulent misrepresentations. The de-
fendant excepted to the court's instruction to the jury that the plaintiff as
entitled to recover fair compensation for his loss. Held, on appeal, that the
charge was an inadequate guide for the jury, the measure of damages bing
the difference between the actual value of the business at the time of the sale
and what it would have been worth had it been as represented. Dombrat:i
v. Active Automobile Exch. (1925, Conn.) 131 At. 404.
The instant case follows the more general rule for estimating damages
in actions upon sales induced by fraudulent misrepresentations of the seller.
Holcomb & Hope Mfg. Co. v. Jones (1924, Okla.) 228 Pac. 968; 2 Sedgviclz,
Damages (9th ed. 1912) 844, 1622. But there is a minority rule that
limits recovery to the difference between the price paid and the actual
value. Smith v. Bolles (1889) 132 U. S. 125, 10 Sup. Ct 39; 2 Sedgwicl,
op. cit. 1624. This latter rule is in accord with the general theory of
damages for tort, in that it compensates for the loss suffered by restoring
the injured party to the status q2o. See (1920) 5 CORN. L. QuART. 1G7.
The other rule is based on a recognition that the loss has resulted from
the breach of a contract of which the defrauded party should have the
benefit. See (1925) 73 U. PA. L. Rnv. 207. And it has no application in
deceit cases wherein the defendant's misrepresentations have induced the
plaintiff to do something other than enter into a contract with the de-
fendant. Cf. Hodgson v. Sidney (1866) L. R. 1 Exch. 313 (payment re-
sulted in bankruptcy). In a common-law state the amount of recovery
might be expected to depend in the contract cases on the form of the action;
but the cases are otherwise. Page v. Johnston (1910) 205 Mlass. 274, 91
N. E. 214 (contract); Morse v. Hutchins (1869) 102 Mlass. 439 (deceit).
Under the codes, the relief should be based on the facts as proved, and not
on the theory of the pleading. See Wood v. Dttdley (1919) 188 App. Div.
136, 144, 176 N. Y. Supp. 494, 500. Objections have been urged against
both rules. Thus, it'has been suggested that the buyer may get the article
for nothing if the represented value be greatly in excess of the actual value.
See CurHis v. Buzard (1916) 254 Pa. 61, 64, 93 At. 777, 778. But actually
this result seems never to have occurred. On the other hand if the buyer
recovers only the difference between the price paid and the actual value,
ample motive for misrepresentation remains. The seller can never lose,
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having received the actual value, and stands to gain by the fraud if it
remains undiscovered. See Wood-v. Dudley, supra, at 142, 176 N. Y. Supp.
at 499. The rule of the instant case, then, seems decidedly the sounder as
more likely to discourage fraud.
HUSBAND AND WIFE--SEPARATION-REFUSAL OF MARITAL INTERCOURSE A
BAR TO SEPARATION SUIT.-The plaintiff and the defendant were married
in a civil ceremony. Being Roman Catholics they agreed not to live to-
gether or consummate the marriage until the celebration of a religious
marriage. The husband refused to go through with the religious cere-
mony; the wife consequently felt forced to continue a separate life and
later sued for separation on grounds of abandonment and non-support.
The husband set up as defense refusal to cohabit. There was judgment
for the defendant; the plaintiff appealed. Held, (two judges dissenting)
that the judgment be affirmed, since the wife's refusal to have marital
intercourse is sufficient to bar her suit. Mirizio v. Mirizio (1926) 242 N. Y.
74.
The dissent in the instant case was placed in part upon the ground
that it was unwise for the court to consider in suits for separation the
question of refusal of marital intercourse. There is, however, a counter
policy which preconceives a norm for the conduct of husband and wife
from which there can be no departure. Thus it has long been recognized
that a marriage may be annulled on grounds of physical incompetence.
D-e v. A-g (1845) 1 Rob. Eccl. 279; see Macqueen, Parliamentary Divorco
(1842) 466. And on apparently similar considerations of policy some
courts, though not the court which decided the instant case, have granted
divorce for refusal to have marital intercourse, generally under the fiction
that such refusal constitutes desertion. Fleegle v. Fleegle (1920) 136
Md. 630, 110 At. 889 (bare refusal); Casey v. Casey (1914) 180 Mo. App.
605, 163 S. W. 569 (refusal combined with other less important causes);
Bishop, Marriage and Divorce (3d ed. 1859) sec. 508; NOTES (1925) 10
CORN. L. QUART. 374. Such refusal has been held ground for divorce
though dictated by religious belief. Fitts v. Fitts (1865) 46 N. H. 184
(Shaker belief); ef. Ringgold v. Ringgold (1920) 128 Va. 485, 104 S. E,
836 (abnormal "Christian" piety). Similarly concubinage, though justi-
fied by religious belief, is ground for divorce. See D'Aguilar v. D'Aguilar
(1794) 1 Hagg. Eccl. 773, 785. In these cases policy obviously should
brush aside the tenets of religious convictions held by a minority. In an
entirely Roman Catholic community, insistence on a religious ceremony
as a condition precedent to marital intercourse might well be considered so
essentially part of the mores as to be legally justifiable. Cf. Connelly v.,
Connelly (1850) 2 Rob. Ecdl. 201, 257. That there is no unifom religion
in New York is patent. And since the New York law recognizes a religious
marriage unaccompanied by any civil ceremony, the civil marriage cere-
mony should be. made use of only by those having no religious scruples.
By itself an agreement not to cohabit until a condition- performed, relating
as it does to so integral a part of the marriage status, is not effective.
Cf. De Vries v. De Vries (1915) 195 Ill. App. 4; Casey v. Casey, supra.
The decision in the instant case could easily have been based on the valid-
ity of the defense that the wife both insisted on living apart and refused
intercourse. Cf. Mirizio v. Mirizio (1925, 1st Dept.) 212 App. Div. 524,
209 N. Y. Supp. 117. That it was based solely on refusal of marital in-
tercourse may perhaps be deemed a judicial intimation that the New York
court might have granted separation in a suit by the husband on the fig-
urative ground of desertion, despite a holding contra in Risk v. Risk (1922,
1st Dept.) 202 App. Div. 299, 195 N. Y. Supp. 536. This is not, however,
a strictly necessary result. The wife's refusal of intercourse may be held
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so to violate her marital duties that her right to the company and sup-
port of the husband is lost, and the husband is privileged to refuce to
fulfill his former duties. Noa sequitur, that the fiction of "desertion" is
to be applied to the behavior of the wife in so violating her duties. Cf.
Synge v. Synge [1900.] Prob. 180, aff'd [1901, C. A.) Prob. 317 (refusal
of intercourse valid defense to divorce suit); Jackson v. Jacl_:so; [1924.]
Prob. 19 (refusal of intercourse no ground for action for support because
of desertion).
INSURANCE-IURDER OF INSURED By BENEFICLAEY-RECOVTERY n3Y A.D-
MINISTRATOR OF INSURED WHERE BENEFICLRY IS PnomisEm OR PAYS THE
PRE . u s.-The beneficiary of two policies of insurance on the life of
her husband murdered the insured. Suit was brought in her behalf against
the insurer to recover on the policies. The administrator of the estate of
the insured intervened. Upon the issues joined between the administrator
and the insurer, the lower court directed a verdict for the insurer. Held,
on appeal, that this was erroneous, since it was for the jury to determine
whether the policies had been taken out by the beneficiary for herself,
rather than as agent for the insured, and whether the beneficiary at the
time she paid the premiums did so with intent to defraud the insurer.
Hewitt v. Equitable Life Assurancc Socicty of UTitcd States (1925, C. C. A.,
9th) 8 Fed. (2d) 706.
It is well settled that a beneficiary who murders the insured cannot re-
cover on the policy. 2 Joyce, Insurance (2d ed. 1917) sec. 833. This is
apparently true irrespective of the beneficiary's motive at the time of ob-
taining the policy. See Mtual Life Insurancc Co. v. Armctrong (1386)
117 U. S. 591, 600, 6 Sup. Ct 877, 81. Or of whether the crime, con-
ceived of at a later date, was committed to realize the benefits of the policy.
Schreiner v. High Court Ill. Cath. Order of Forestcrs (1889) 35 Ill. App.
576. In England, where a donee beneficiary is not deemed to have a "veated
interest" in the policy, there would seem to be no objection to allowing
recovery by the representative of the insured. Cleaver v. Mvt ,al Rcccri'c
Fund Life Assoc. [1891, C. A.] 1 Q. B. 147. Under the prevailing American
view, however, the beneficiary of an old line life insurance policy is said to
gain a "vested interest". Vance, The Beneficiary's Intercst in a Lifc In-
surance Policy (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNL, 343; CO:,sIn NS (1925) 34
YALE LAw JOURNAL, 533. And where the admission of declarations by the
insured, made after the issue of the policy, is dependent upon his having
an "interest" in the contract it has been held that the insured has no such
"interest". MeEwen v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1919, Calif. App.) 183
Pac. 373; see NOTES (1920) 4 MINN. L. REv. 359. A holding that wvhere
the beneficiary is denied recovery on the policy, the insurer's responsibility
is gone, is obviously consistent with such a theory. Spicer- v..New ior
Life Ing. Co. (1920, C. C. A., 5th) 263 Fed. 500; see (1921) 34 HA v. L.
REV. 788. But it seems inaccurate to say that the beneficiary has the
interest to the exclusion of the insured. The origin of the beneficiary's
right was in a declaration of trust by the insured in favor of the bene-
ficiary. Vance, loc. cit. And where the beneficiary forfeits this equitable
right by a felonious act most courts properly hold that a trust results to
the representatives of the insured. Henry v. Knights and DaugJters of
Tabor (1923) 156 Ark. 165, 246 S. W. 17; Kaecontas v. Fedcral Life Im,.
Co. (1921) 193 Iowa, 343, 185 N. W. 125; Joyce, loc. cit. But the insurer
has been absolved from responsibility where the beneficiary would have
been the sole distributee. Johnston r. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1910,
W. Va.) 100 S. E. 865; McDonald v. Mutual Life Inz-. Co. (1916) 178 Iowa,
863, 160 N. W. 289; (1920) 18 Mioa. L. REV. 430. Likewise, where the
insured murdered the beneficiary, under a provision that if the beneficiary
759
760 YALE LAW JOURNAL
predeceased the insured, the interest of the beneficiary should vest in the
insured, the insurer was excused. Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
(1925, App. Div. 2d Dept.) 211 N. Y. Supp. 755; (1926) 39 HA, v. L. REV.,
394; see (1924) 33 YALn LAW JOURNAL, 889. It would seem that the
insurer should also be absolved both in the case where the promise runs
to the beneficiary directly, and where, although the insured is the nominal
promisee, the premiums are paid by the beneficiary.
INTERxATIONAL LAW-RESPONSIBILITY OF A PUBLIC AGENT OF A FORIAGN
SOVEREIGN-A resident of Germany filed his bill in New Jersey praying
that he be adjudged owner of certain shares in the defendant corporation.
The Public Trustee of Great Britain was made a co-defendant. The bill
alleged that the certificates had been on deposit in London at the beginning
of the War, and that they had been seized by the Trustee without au-
thority. The Trustee filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court on the
ground that the suit was in fact against his sovereign. The lower court
refused to allow the plea, and the defendant appealed. Held, that the
order be affirmed, for the defendant; would be answerable if he had ex-
ceeded his authority and the court had jurisdiction to determine this issue.
Pilger v. United States Steel Corp. (1925, N. J.) 130 Atl. 523.
An act of a sovereign within its own territory is not subject to review
by a foreign court. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (1909) 213
U. S. 347, 357, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 513; Oetien v. Central Leather Co. (1918)
246 U. S. 297, 304, 38 Sup. Ct. 309, 311. But under Anglo-American law
all public agents are held responsible for acts in excess of their authority.
Sloan Shipyards v. United States Fleet Corp. (1922) 258 U. S. 549, 568,
42 Sup. Ct. 386, 389; Cameron v. Kjte (1835, P.C.) 3 Knapp, 332; Cobbett,
Leading Cases on International Law (3d ed. 1909) 18. Consequently it
'has been held in domestic cases that a complaint against a public agent
-should allege that the act complained of was unauthorized and that an
action thus brought cannot be defeated by a mere assertion that the act
-was on behalf of the sovereign and under color of office. United States v,
Lee (1882) 106 U. S. 196, 210, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 252; Salaman v. Secretary of
.State for India [1906] 1 K. B. 613; Mostyn v. Fabrigas (1774, K. B.) 1
Cowp. 161. The public agent must plead his authority and prove by evi-
dence that he acted within it. Scranton v. Wheeler (1900) 179 U. S. 141,
152, 21 Sup. Ct. 48, 52; Musgrave v. Pulido (1879, P. C.) L. R. 5 App. Cas,
102. The Supreme Court has adopted this view of the nature of this de-
fense for international cases. Underhill v. Hernandez (1897) 168 U. S.
250, 18 Sup. Ct. 83. A further possibility in such cases as the present
is ratification by the sovereign whose agent is sued. Such ratification
should be communicated through the regular diplomatic channels. Of.
Kunglig v. Dexter (1924, S. D. N.Y.) 300 Fed. 891, 893. This may be by
the sovereign making an appearance in court through an ambassador or
other duly accredited representative: a mere suggestion from the ambassa-
dor or an amicus curiae is insufficient. See In re Muir (1921) 254 U. S.
"522, 532, 41 Sup. Ct. 185, 187. Or it may be by the sovereign treating di-
-rectly with our executive department, resulting in our Attorney General's
appearing in court to present the matter of ratification for the foreign sov-
ereign. The Exchange v. McFadden (1812, U. S.) 7 Cranch, 116. Such
ratification makes the acts of the agent "acts of state", terminating the
responsibility of the agent for them in any court either at home or abroad
and leaving the sovereign answerable only by its consent or through inter-
matfonal negotiations. Buron v. Denman (1848) 2 Exch. 167; O'Reilley v.
Brooke (1908) 209 U. S. 45, 28 Sup. Ct. 439.
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OIL AND GAS LEASE-LEqsEE's INTEREsr IN SuPniAcs-DAzAG s For,
TEMPORARY FLOODING OF SURFACE BY Lnssom.-The plaintiff, le2zee of an
oil, gas, and mineral lease, sued the lessor for damages caused by the
lessor's dam which temporarily flooded the surface of the leased premises.
Damages were recovered as for an injury to a leasehold interest on the
basis of the difference in market value of the leasehold flooded and un-
flooded. The defendant appealed. Held, (one judge dc,-enting) that the
judgment was correct. Humble Oil & Refizing Co. v. Wood (1925, Tex.
Civ. App.) 277 S. W. 152.
Some courts, including Texas, hold that the owner of the surface owns
the oil and gas in place just as he owns coal or other solid minerals.
Preston v. White (1905) 57 W. Va. 278, 50 S. E. 23G; Stcplzcz Coaty v.
Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co. (1923) 113 Tex. 160, 254 S. W. 290. This
ownership, however, is qualified to the extent that the title to the oil or
gas in place is lost when captured by an adjoining landowner. Prairic
Oil & Gas Co. v. State (1921, Tex. Com. App.) 231 S. W. 1038. And the
grantee of an oil and gas lease seems to get an interest in the surface-
something in the nature of a leasehold estate-on which he can even bring
an action of ejectment. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co. (1909) 225 Pa. 338,
74 Atl. 207. But other courts have held that oil and gas in place are in-
capable of absolute ownership and that title is only acquired by actual
reduction to possession. Ohio Oil Co. v. IRdiana (1900) 177 U. S. 190, 20
Sup. Ct. 576. This non-ownership doctrine is now deemed to be the clear
weight of authority and the sounder view. 1 Thornton, Law of Oil and
Gas (4th ed. 1925) sec. 25a. et seq.; Summers, Legal Iatcrc t in; Oil and
Gas (1921) 4 ILL. L. QuART. 12, 167; COMMENTS (1925) 13 Ky. L. Jouma
152. Thus the interest conveyed by an oil and gas lease should properly be
called an easement of exploration and a profit a prendre. Rich v. Donegrecy
(1918) 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86; Simonton, Nature of the IntCrCet of tI,4
Grantee Under an Oil and Gas Lease (1918) 25 W. VA. L. QuAn. 295.
The easement is of such character as to amount to the possession of only
such parts of the leased lands as may be reasonably necessary for the
exploration and development of oil and gas. Sanders v. Davis (1920) 79
Okla. 253, 192 Pac. 694. The lessee's dealings with the surface are, there-
fore, limited. Dietz v. Mlission Transfer Co. (1892) 95 Calif. 92, 30 Pac.
380 (lessee not permitted to use land for pumping or storing oil obtained
from other lands); Bubb v. Parker & Edwards Oil Co. (1916) 252 Pa. 26,
97 AtI. 114 (nor to use surface for converting oil from other lands into
gasoline); Fowler v. Delaplain (1909) 79 Ohio St. 279, 87 N. E. 200;
Prigg v. Preston (1905) 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 272 (nor to use for cultivation
or dwellings for employees). Under the non-ovnership doctrine ejectment
cannot be brought by the lessee. Priddy v. Thompson (1913, C. C. A. 8th)
204 Fed. 955; cf. Ewert v. Robinson (1923, C. C. A. 8th) 289 Fed. 740.
But an injunction is available to protect his interests. Guieffy t. Smith
(1915) 237 U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct. 526. Conceding the flooding of the
land in the instant case to be an injury to, or obstruction of, the plaintiff's
easement, the general rules as to damages for such obstructions to ease-
ments should apply. New York Cent. & H. R. R. v. Shattcmec Yact &
Canoe Club (1908, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 57 Misc. 482, 109 N. Y. Supp. 933
(recovery of actual damages); Flcing v. Baltimre & Ohio Ry. (1902) 51
W. Va. 54, 41 S. E. 168 (nominal damages if no actual injury); Big Sandy
Ry. v. Bays (1907) 31 Ky. L. 288, 102 S. W. 302 (damages must be proxi-
mate result of obstruction); Freeman v. Sayre (188G) 48 N. J. L. 37, 2
Atl. 650 (damages limited to those sustained prior to time of action) ;
Neff v. Pennsylvania Ry. (1902) 202 Pa. 371, 51 Atl. 1038 (except where per-
manent and necessarily continuous injury). Thus, since the obstruction in
the instant case was temporary, in order to recover the lessened value of
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the easement, the plaintiff should have alleged and proved that, as a proxi-
mate result of the lessor's acts, he had sustained actual damages to that
extent by being prevented from completing a particular sale. But even
according to the leasehold theory followed by the Texas court, the measure
of damages used seems justifiable only on the theory that the flooding by
lessor was a per nent obstruction. 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant
(1912) sec. 85. This does not appear to have been the case.
PROBATE PRACTICE-PARTIES-CHILD ADOPTED BY CONTRACT MAY CON-
TEST WiLL.-Under a contract between the contestant's guardian and the
proponent's testatrix and her husband, it was agreed that the testatrix
and her husband would take the contestant into their home, maintain and
educate her, and make her their heir. Due to some disagreement, the
testatrix prevented the contestant from continuing her relationship and
omitted her from her will. The contestant filed a caveat to the probate of
the will, charging undue influence. The trial court ruled that the con-
testant, as an equitably adopted child, could caveat the will. The propo-
nent appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Ezell v. Mobley
(1925, Ga.) 129 S. E. 532.
Only those persons may contest a will who would be benefited by its
being set aside. Hahn v. Hammerstein (1917) 272 Mo. 248, 198 S. W. 833,
An heir, whether natural or adopted, may do so. Bernero v. Goodwin
(1916) 267 Mo. 427, 184 S. W. 74. Since the power of adoption is generally
regarded as exclusively statutory, an adoption confers the status of a blood
child only when the statutory requirements are fulfilled. Watts v. Dull
(1900) 184 Ill. 86, 56 N. E. 303. Nevertheless, mere contracts to adopt do
give certain equitable rights. Crawford v. Wilson (1913) 139 Ga. 654, '18
S. E. 30. Some courts will enforce such agreements by declaring the
adopted child an heir to the person contracting to adopt. Lynn v. Hockaday
(1901) 162 Mo. 111, 61 S. W. 885; Barney v. Hutchinson (1918) 25 N. M.
82, 177 Pac. 890. But it has been held in Georgia that the contract alone
without a court decree is inoperative to give the promisee the status of
heir. Pair v. Pair (1918) 147 Ga. 754, 95 S. E. 295. The more usual
remedy, in these cases, is an action for specific performance against the
heirs or personal representative of the party contracting to adopt. Thus,
in adoption contracts containing a promise to leave a specific estate, the
adoption clause is disregarded and the remainder of the contract treated
as an ordinary contract to devise. Anderson v. Anderson (1907) 75 Kan.
117, 88 Pac. 743 (promise to leave all the property they died possessed of).
The courts apparently will treat adoption contracts as contracts to devise
whenever they can possibly spell out a promise to leave an ascertainable
estate. Thus in cases wherein the promise was to make the child the
heir of the promisor without more, the child has been allowed an action,
analogous to that on a contract to devise, to recover that part of the estate.
not disposed of by will. Crawford v. Wilson, supra; Nowack v,. Berger
(1896) 133 Mo. 24, 34 S. W. 489 (promise to treat as own child); see
Middleworth v. Ordway (1908) 191 N. Y. 404, 414, 84 N. E. 291, 292. Like-
wise, when the promise was that the child to be adopted should share
the promisor's estate equally with his son. Peterson v. Baurne (1909)
83 Neb. 405, 119 N. W. 764. The instant case adopts the novel pro-
cedure of permitting the child to contest the will. But a beneficiary or
promisee under a contract to devise cannot contest a will. Allen v. Brorn-
berg (1906) 147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771. And, as has been noted above, this
court has held that a court decree is necessary to give the child the status
of heir. Pair v. Pair, supra. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the result
is sound. For in any case the probate court must first determine the ca-
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pacities of the various parties to a will contest, and that is all that was
done in the instant case. The determination has been found proper on re-
view, and to compel the contestant to start proceedings anew in accordance
with the more usual practice in this particular class of case would seem
to be a needless formality.
SALES--IBIrLIEn WARRANTY OF WHOLESOMENES---VENDoz CArmOr RE-
covER THEREON WHEN SAIE Is MLnDE IN B11MGH OF SUNDAY STTuM.-In
breach of a Sunday statute, a third party sold the plaintiff a bottled
drink manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff was made ill by the
drink, which contained dead flies. In an action sounding in tort for false
warranty of wholesomeness the plaintiff had judgment and the defendant
appealed. Held, (two judges disscntig) that the judgment be reversed
since the plaintiff had no rightful possession of the drink. Grapics Bot-
tling Co. v. Ennis (1925, Biss.) 106 So. 97.
The absence of any contractual relation between the parties in the instant
case would preclude recovery under the contract theory of warranty.
Drury v. Armour (1919) 140 Ark. 371, 216 S. W. 40. Formerly it would
have prevented recovery under the tort theory as well, since it was the
seller-buyer relationship that raised the warrantor's obligation. Con-
iENTS (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOUN.AL, 782, note 7; Williston, Salc 12d ed.
1924) sec. 244, note 46. If the parties did not contract with each otler,
it was said, there could be no representation by the one to the other on
which to base the warranty. Williston, op. cit. 489. This view still ob-
tains in some states. Peletler v. Dzpont (1925) 124 Mle. 209, 128 At]. 186;
Roberts v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assoc. (1912) 211 Mlass. 449, 98 N. E.
95. But many courts, including Mississippi, recognizing that many articles
are nowadays bought from dealers, in reliance on the label or advertise-
ments of the manufacturer, have frankly abrogated, in such cases, the
requirement of contractual privity. Waters-Picrce Co. v. Descln'. (190 S
212 U. S. 159, 178, 29 Sup. Ct. 270, 276; Jacsonz Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
-v. Chapman (1914) 106 Mliss. 868, 64 So. 791; Rainwatce v. Hatteob?,rg
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1923) 131 Mliss. 315, 95 So. 444; Williston, op. cit.
note 47. In denying recovery because the plaintiff had no rightful posses-
sion of the drink, the court said: "The warranty runs with the sale and
passes with the title and where the sale, as in this case, is made void by
statute, and where the plaintiff is a participant in the sale, he cannot re-
cover although the statute makes the crime apparently apply to the seller
alone." Thus the court took the position that he had committed no offense
against the state. It must, then, have thought his possession wrongful
as against either the seller or the defendant. But it is well settled that
after a sale made on Sunday the seller cannot recover the chattel deliverel
to the buyer, even though the court will not compel the buyer to pay the
price if that be unpaid. Troeert Adm'r V. Decker (18SO) 51 Wis. 46.
Nor is the seller privileged to retake. Kinwy v. McDernot (1881) 55
Iowa, 674. It would seem, therefore, that the plaintiff in the instant case
had good title and rightful possession against the state and the seller; and
since the defendant had, prior to the sale to the plaintiff, passed all rights
in the drink to the seller, it is impossible to see how the plaintiff's posses-
sion or title could be defective as against him. The decision amounts to
the imposition on the plaintiff of a penalty for buying goods on Sunday.
But the court says that he committed no crime. Why, then, the penalty?
But even if he had committed a crime, there is, as the United States
Supreme Court has pointed out, no authority in a court to add denial of
recovery to the penalty actually provided for in a statute. Phi! cdcIphi
R. R. v. Philadelphia Steamboat Co. (1859, U. S.) 23 How. 209. .Iot
modern courts do permit recovery unless the prohibited act is the proximate
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cause of the injury. Sutton v..Wauwatos. (1871) 29 Wis. 21; Frint fotor-
car Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin (1919) 168 Wis. 436, 170 N.
W. 285. The contrary rule, exemplified in the instant case, once had some
following. Bosworth v. Swansey (1845) 51 Mass. 363; Hinckley v. Penob-
scot (1856) 42 Me. 89. But it has been repudiated in no uncertain terms
in the great majority of jurisdictions. Philadelphia R. R. v. Philadelphia
Steamboat Co., supra; Sutton v. Wauwatosa, supra; Knight v. Brown
.(1900) 93 Me. 557, 45 Atl. 827.
SALES-STIPULATION AGAINST CANCELLATION BY BUYER HELD BINDING.-
The defendant contracted to purchase from the plaintiff's assignor a farm
lighting plant. The contract provided that, in case the buyer cancelled,
the seller might at its option hold the goods for the buyer or deliver them
to a common carrier-either to be full performance entitling the seller to
the purchase price. The defendant cancelled before shipment and the
seller exercised his option to ship. In an action for the price the plaintiff
was nonsuited and appealed. Held, that the judgment be reversed. Ravine
v. Volk (1925, Wis.) 205 N. W. 385.
It is, of course, well settled, where the goods are readily resalable, that
repudiation by the buyer ends the seller's power by shipping to create a
right in himself to the purchase price. Montauk Co. v. Daigger Co. (1925)
141 Va. 686, 126 S. E. 681; Anson, Contracts (Corbin's 4th ed. 1924) sees.
385-386. The seller's remedy is an action for damages measured by the
difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods in
question. Kahn v. Schoen Silk Corp. (1925) 147 Md. 516, 128 At. 359.
The instant case raises the question whether a buyer can, by contract, in
cases such as the Montauk case, supra, waive the power there in question
and, in effect, give to his seller a right to specific performance in a case
in which the law in the absence of such stipulation has denied such right.
'The nature of the relief is more obvious where the seller is the defendant;
and in such cases courts have said that specific performance could not be
made available by contract of the parties since the "jurisdiction" of equity
is not dependent on the will of the parties. Manchester Dairy System v.
Hayward (1926, N. H.) 132 At. 12; see Baker v. Varney (1900) 129 Calif.
564, 566, 62 Pac. 100, 101; but cf. Pratt-Low Co. v. Evans (1921) 55 Calif.
App. 724, 204 Pac. 241. It is submitted, however, that there would be,
properly speaking, no jurisdictional question involved. Cook, Powers of
Courts of Equity (1915) 15 CAL. L. Rnv. 228. Provisions like that in the
instant case have been held unenforceable on the ground that parties cannot
contract not to break a contract. Outcault Adv. Co. v. Mack (1924, Mo.
App.) 259 S. W. 511; Colt Co. v. Watson (1923, Mo. App.) 247 S. W. 493;
contra: Elwood Grain Co. v. Whitefield Groc. Co. (1920, C. C. A. 5th)
268 Fed. 521. The artificiality of such reasoning suggests an "inarticulate
major premise". It is submitted that that premise is that our rules of
commercial law should conduce to the flow of commodities into the hands
of those best able to use them. A man is led to repudiation, it would seem,
by the belief that he cannot profitably use what he has contracted to buy.
The law has said that it is unsound policy under these circumstances to
force the goods upon him unless, indeed, the economic waste involved is
already consummattd-i.e., unless goods, made to the buyer's order and not
readily salable elsewhere, are ready for delivery at the date of repudiation.
Uniform Sales Act, sec. 63 (3); Standard Fabrics Corp. v. Hob Mfg. Co.
(1922, 1st Dept.) 199 App. Div. 508, 191 N. Y. Supp. 821. If it is unsound
to force the goods upon the seller under these circumstances, it is submitted
that it is unsound to let him contract away his "freedom" to repudiate--not
:as a matter of paternalism but as a matter of economic engineering.
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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX OF 1917---"UNIViDED PrOFITS" INTEM-
PRETED TO INCLUDE CURRENT EARNING.-Section 31 (b) of the Revenue
Act of October 3, 1917 (40 Stat. at L. 300, 338) provided that any distri-
butions made to corporate shareholders in 1917 or subsequent tax years
shall be "deemed to have been made from the most recently accumulated
undivided profits or surplus, . and shall be taxed to the distributce
at the rates . for the years in which such profits or surplus were
accumulated ." The plaintiff's testator received in 1917, as share-
holder in a certain corporation, a so-called "depletion dividend" which the
corporation purported to pay from its "depletion reserve" accumulated
prior to 1917. In a suit to recover taxes paid, alleged to have been erron-
eously assessed at the 1917 rate instead of the 1916 rate, judgment was for
the defendant, but this judgment was reversed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. Held, on certiorari, (four judges disscnting) that the 1917 rate
was applicable since the corporation's earnings for 1917 prior to this
dividend were sufficient to pay it and all other dividends previously declared
in that year. Edwards v. Douglas (1925, U. S.) 46 Sup. Ct. 85.
The plaintiff contended that the Revenue Act meant that a dividend
should be deemed to have been paid from the most recent accumulation of
profits which, before payment of the dividend, appeared on the booha of
the corporation as having been added to the undivided profits or surplus
account of a fiscal year. Technical terms occurring in tax statutes are to
be given their technical meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurdity
or to an obvious inconsistency with other provisions of the statute.
Tennant v. Smith [1892] L. R. A. C. 150; Maxwell, IMterpretation of,
Statutes (6th ed. 1920) 3. On the basis of this presumption the Supreme
Court conceded the technical sense of the term "surplus" in the statute as
meaning the profits which at the close of earlier accounting periods were
carried into the surplus account. But it was unable to find any single sense
in which the term "undivided profits" is used by accountants, and it con-
cluded that these words were intended by Congress to describe current un-
distributed earnings. Undoubtedly "profits" frequently denotes only thoc_
net earnings found at the close of a fiscal period. Drysdale and McGiffin,
Corporate Earnings as Gains, Profits, and Income as Depcnding Up671 the
Tirize of Their Accrual (1918) 16 MICH. L. Rnv. 232. It is also true that
the general rule is to construe uncertain tax statutes in favor of the tax
payer. Gould v. Gould (1917) 245 U. S. 151, 33 Sup. Ct. 53. Certain of
the income tax cases may be thought to have departed somewhat from this
general canon of construction. Cf. Peabody e. Eiszer (1918) 247 U. S.
347, 38 Sup. Ct. 546; Lynch z,. Hornby (1918) 247 U. S. 339, 3S Sup. Ct.
543; United States v. Phcllis (1921) 257 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 63; Rockc-
feller v. United States (1921) 257 U. S. 176, 42 Sup. Ct. GS; Hecht v.
Malley (1924) 265 U. S. 144, 44 Sup. Ct. 462; Drysdale and McGiflin, op.
cit. But it is nevertheless believed still to be the law. In view, therefore,
of the uncertain meaning of the term "undivided profits", the decision
may seem at first thought to be of doubtful propriety. It is submitted,
however, that the reverse is true. It is not the ambiguity of a casual
reading of the immediate context that calls for the application of the doc-
trine of the Gould case, supra, but only the ambiguity that remains after
a careful study of the whole statute and the circumstances attending its
enactment. As the court pointed out, in view of the general legislative
intent of Congress in enacting the Revenue Act of 1917-to -wit, to maze
war profits pay the high war taxes-the meaning of the section seems free
-from doubt. The dissenting justices wrote no opinions.
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TORTS--ImPUTED NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF AUTOMOBILE
DRIVER BARS RECOVERY OF WIFE CARRIED AS PASSENGER.-The plaintiff was
riding at night in an automobile driven by her husband. In an accident
due to the combined negligence of her husband and the defendant, the
plaintiff was injured. The lower court directed a verdict for the defend-
ant. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed on the ground that
the husband's contributory negligence was imputable to the plaintiff.
Holsaple v. Superintendents of the Poor of Menominee County (1925, Mich.)
205 N. W. 529.
The doctrine of imputed negligence first grew out of the fiction of
"identification" in interest. Thorogood v. Bryan (1849, C. P.) 8 C. B. 11$
(negligence of an omnibus driver imputed to his passenger). This case
was overruled in The Bernina (1887) L. R. 12 Prob. Div. 58. And re-
pudiated in this country in Little v. Hackett (1886) 116 U. S. 366. The
contributory negligence of a servant is imputed to the master in all juris-
dictions. (1906) 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 635 (collecting the cases). And the
courts still resort to the fiction of agency to explain imputed negligence
when certain relationships exist between the person injured and the one
whose negligence is imputed to him, even though no agency in fact exists,
Michigan seems to be the sole jurisdiction which still imputes to the pas-
senger as a matter of law the contributory negligence of a driver of a
private vehicle. COM'.ENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 639; Gilmore,
Imputed Negligence (1921) 1 Wis. L. Rnv. 193. The passenger himself,
however, may be contributorily negligent and thus be denied recovery, the
majority of the courts holding him to a standard of reasonable care. Penn-
sylvania By. v. Henderson (1910, C. C. A. 3d) 179 Fed. 577. While others
adopt a very strict rule and hold a passenger to be under the same duty
of lookout as the driver. Beemer v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. (1917) 181
Iowa, 642, 162 N. W. 43. One case has gone so far as to hold that a pas-
senger must virtually direct all the movements of the driver in order to be
free from contributory negligence. Howe v. Corey (1920) 172 Wis. 537,
179 N. W. 791. The practical effect of such a rule is to impute the
negligence of the driver directly to the passenger. A few states still
impute the negligence of the husband to the wife. Carlisle v. Town of
Sheldon (1866)"38 Vt. 440; Peck v. New York, N. H. & H. By. (1882) 50
Conn. 379. Or that of a parent to a very young child. Hartfield v. Roper
(1839, N. Y.) 21 Wend. 615. Or where the driver and his passenger are
engaged in a common enterprise. See Koplitz v. City of St. Paul (1902)
86 Minn. 373, 90 N. W. 794. In all the above situations the courts are
inclined to presume an agency to explain the imputation, and the fact
that the negligent husband or father shared in the damages recovered was
undoubtedly an element influencing the courts to imply an agency when
those relationships existed. See Basler v. Sacramento, etc. Co. (1910) 158
Calif. 514, 111 Pac. 530. But there is nothing inherent in such relation-
ships to give rise to an implied agency as a matter of law. Sound public
policy requires a principal to be liable to third parties for the negligence
of his agent; but there is no good reason why the negligence of his agent
should preclude the principal from recovering for the latter's own injuries.
The defense of contributory negligence has been much weakened by the
assaults of the Workmen's Compensation Acts and the application of the
admiralty rule regarding damages recovered. See Marx, The Curse of the
Personal Injury Suit and a Remedy (1924) 10 A. B. A. JOUR. 493; Mac-
Murchy, Contributory Negligence (1923) 1 CAN. BAR. REV. 844. It is
difficult, therefore, to see why the imputation of contributory negligence
should be recognized, particularly where the agency, non-existent in fact,
must be presumed from the relationship between the parties.
CASE NOTES
TORTS-NEGLIGENT WORDS-DAMAGES AWI"ED FOR STATEI.E1NTS NEGLI-
GENTLY MADE.-The plaintiff sued the defendant for negligent misrepre-
sentation respecting the sale of a farm. The lower court charged the jury
that "a person who acts upon a false representation, made for the purpose
of inducing him to vary his line of conduct, may recover any damages he
sustains, if the statement was fraudulent, or if it was negligently made."
The defendant excepted. Held, that the exception be overruled. Wcrton v.
Brown (1925, N. H.) 131 Atl. 141.
At an early date statements made by a vendor to a vendee, known to be
false and inducing action on the part of the other, were actionable only
on the ground of false warranty. Chandelor v. Lopus (1630, Exch.) Cro.
Jac. 4. Later these warranty cases furnished the basis for the modem
law of deceit, first recognized in Pasley v. Frecau (17S9, K. B.), 3 T. R
51; Williston, Liability for Honest Misreprescntation, (1910) 24 HAnV. L. REV.
415, 416. A further extension exists today in the cases in which the element
of "scienter", necessary to an action for deceit, is disregarded, and an
action granted for negligent words on the ground that fraud is "conclusively
presumed". Williams v. Hume (1925, Ind.) 149 N. E. 355; Hilligas v. Kna
(1910) 86 Neb. 63, 124 N. W. 925. These cases, on their facts, seem
confined so far to situations where a duty, generally contractual, exists or
arises subsequently on the part of the defendant other than that created
by the probability of injury by the words themselves. Williams v. Humne,
supra (negligent statement as to amount of land sold to plaintiff);
Cunningham v. Pease (1908) 74 N. H. 435, 69 Atl. 120 (negligent statement
that stove polish sold to plaintiff was not explosive); Skillings v. Altcn
(1919) 143 Minn. 323, 173 N. W. 663 (physician negligently advised that
it was safe to visit child who had scarlet fever). But the existence of a
contract duty is apparently not always essential. Houston v. Thornton
(1898) 122 N. C. 365, 29 S. E. 827. And the language of the courts, as in
the instant case, indicates a broader rule of responsibility, no particular
stress being placed on such a relationship. Williams v. Humc, supra,
at 356; Skillings v. Allen, supra, at 325, 173 N. W. at 663. It would seem
merely that some particular relationship between the parties is 2iusally
necessary in order to make a reliance on words reasonable; but given a
proper case where reliance is reasonable, absence of such relationship
should not bar recovery. Smith, Liability for Negligcnt Language (1900)
14 HARV. L. Rnv. 184, 197. There seems to be no legalistic barrier to
overcome, such as the requirement of a contractual relationship in the
negligence cases following Winterbottom v. Wright (1842, Exch.) 10 IeW2 .
& W. 109. In these cases to-day the "natural and probable consequence"
rule has been given a free flow by the breaking down of the legalistic
barrier. Buick Co. v. MacPherson (1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050.
It is submitted that likewise the action for negligent words may be gen-
eralized, as is suggested in the instant case, recovery being granted wher-
ever one person relies upon a statement made by another, who negligently
volunteers an erroneous opinion, intending that it be acted upon, and
knowing that loss or injury is likely to follow if it is. Edwards v. Lamb
(1899) 69 N. H. 599, 45 Atl. 480; Smith, op. cit. 197.
TRuSTS-SPENDTHRiFT TRUSTS-EVIDENCE OF INTENT TO CEATE.-A tes-
tator devised his realty outright to his son, and left certain securities to
trustees for his benefit, the income therefrom to be paid to his son "direct",
the corpus eventually in three installments at ten year intervals. The
son becoming insolvent during the life of the trust, his trustee in bank-
ruptcy sought to sequester the bankrupt's interest in the trust property.
From a dismissal of the petition the trustee appealed. Held, that the
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decree be affirmed, since an intention to create a spendthrift trust was
shown by the direct gift of the realty, and by the provisions for "direct"
payment of income and the installment payment of the corpus. Jones v.
Harrison (1925, C. C. A. 8th) 7 Fed. (2d) 461.
In civil-law countries the protection of spendthrifts is accomplished by
appointing a guardian and through him limiting the spendthrift's power
to contract. See Wright, The Law of Prodigals (1900) 16 L. QUART. REV.
57. Some of our states have followed this method by enacting statutes
analogous to those dealing with lunatics. See Modlich v. Jennings (1923)
244 Mass. 183, 138 N. E. 897; Cannon v. Robinson (1923) 95 Okla. 89,
218 Pac. 872; cf. Reeves v. Hunter (1919) 185 Iowa, 958, 171 N. W. 567.
But such statutes are applied only in cases of notorious prodigality. See
Guardianship of Reed (1921) 173 Wis. 628, 182 N. W. 329. More gen-
erally the problem has been dealt with by individuals interested in the
prodigal through the creation of a spendthrift trust, thus limiting the
amount of funds at the spendthrift's disposal. The first cases to allow
such trusts stressed the freedom of the individual to attach to his gifts
such conditions as he chose. Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams (1882) 133
Mass. 170; see Nichols v. Eaton (1875) 91 U. S. 716, 727. (For the con-
trary English view, see Lewin, Trusts [12th ed. 1911] 111). Clear evi-
dence of the settlor's intent to establish a spendthrift trust is required to
defeat the claims of the cestui's creditors. Dudley v. Turner (1925, C. C. A.
4th) 7 Fed. (2d) 118; L'Hommedieu v. L'Hominedieu (1915, N. J.) 131
Atl. 302; see First Nat'l Bank v. Burns (1917, Mo. App.) 199 S. W. 282,
286. But the cestui need not, in fact, be a spendthrift. Adams v. Wil-
liams (1923) 112 Tex. 469, 248 S. W. 673; see Morgan's Estate (1909)
223 Pa. 228, 230, 72 Atl. 498, 499. Some statutes have put practically
all trusts, regardless of the settlor's intent, on a par with the spendthrift
trust as to immunity from creditors' claims. N. Y. Real Prop. Law, 1909,
sec. 98; see Graff v. Bonnett (1865) 31 N. Y. 9, 14; Scott, Cases on Trusts
(1919) 599, note. The instant case may indicate, in view of the meagre-
ness of the evidence relied on, a judicial tendency in the same direction.
Cf. Commerce Trust Co. v. Bayles (1925, Mo. App.) 273 S. W. 759;
Black v. Bailey (1920) 142 Ark. 201, 207, 218 S. W. 210, 212 (dissenting
opinion). But a counter tendency is observable in the statutes of some
states which limit the amounts that can be so protected against creditors'
claims. Magner v. Crooks (1903) 139 Calif. 640, 73 Pac. 585; Costigan,
Cases on Trusts (1925) 471, note. In the balance of these two tendencies
probably lies the solution of the problem of the much criticized spendthrift
trust. For to allow large spendthrift trusts is to enable the beneficiary to
make a display of wealth calculated to deceive creditors, whereas to forbid
them entirely is to deprive parents and others of the possibility of assuring
after their own death the means of subsistence to donees in whose financial
ability they have little confidence. But in a state wherein the amount of
these trusts is not limited, the decision in the instant case, amounting,
as it does, to a virtual presumption in their favor, seems to reach a result
of doubtful desirability.
WILLS--LIFE TENANT OF PERSONALTY IN DEVISE OF RESIDUE AS DEBTOR
TO REMIAINDERAN.-T devised the residue of his estate to W for life,
"she to have full possession, control over, and management of the princi-
pal of all my personal estate, and to manage and invest same in whatever
manner she may deem proper, and shall not be required to give any se-
curity therefor. . . ." The value of the estate increased under W's
management. She died, naming as her beneficiaries, X, Y, and Z, who were
also remaindermen under T's will. The Commonwealth intervened to
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collect an inheritance tax. The children contended that the increased
value of the estate was not subject to an inheritance tax, since they tool
as remaindermen of T, not as devisees of W. Held, that the tax be imposed,
since the statute requiring that the life tenant post a bond to secure the
remaindermen (Pa. Sts., 1920, sec. 8511) is to be construed as making the
former a debtor to the latter for the value of the estate at the death of
the testator. In re Kirkpatrick's Estate (1925, Pa.) 131 At]. 361.
Where a residue of personalty is devised for life, all property of a
wasting nature must be converted by the executor or trustee and invested
in such securities as the court deems proper, the interest thereon to ba
paid to the life tenant, while the principal is preserved for the remainder-
man. Howe v. Dartmouth (1802, Ch.) 7 Ves. 137; Smith v. Field (1926,
N. J. Ch.) 131 Atl. 521. Some jurisdictions permit the life tenant to
obtain possession, and enjoy the income in spcie upon posting a bond to
secure the remainderman. Whittcmore r. Rzscll (1888) 80 Me. 297, 14
Atl. 197; see Healey v. Toppan (1864) 45 N. H. 243, 263; 3 Woerner,
American Law of Administration (3d ed. 1923) see. 456. But it has been
argued that a court of probate has no power to exact security under these
circumstances unless expressly permitted to do so by special enactment.
See Kales, Future Interests (1920) 568, and. note; Lippcncott v. WDrdci
(1826, Pa.) 14 Serg. & R. 115, 118. Statutes like that in the instant case
have been enacted to overcome this objection. N. J. Comp. Sts., 1910,
3089, sec. 8; Conn. Gen. Sts., 1918, ch. 254, sec. 4962. The rule of Howe
v. Dartrzouth, supra, applies in England "to short leaseholds, foreign
bonds, shares in trading companies, a business carried on by the te3tator,
and generally to all investments not authorized by law." 2 Jarman,
Wills (6th ed. 1910) 1243. And the life tenant is entitled to receive but
four per cent. interest on their value. Cf. Iu re Evans' Will Trunts [1921]
2 Ch. 309. But where the testator's intent appears to favor enjoyment in
specie by the life tenant, the intent will control even though the residue
is of a wasting nature. Stanicr r. Hodgkinsnao (1903) 73 L. J. Ch. 179;
In re Bland [1899] 2 Ch. 336. The New Jersey statute did not abrogate
the rule of Howe v. Dartmontb. Ott v. Tewksb.ry (1908) 75 N. J. Eq. 4,
71 At. 302. The effect of the Connecticut statute has been to treat the
life tenant as a trustee with the usual requirement of a trustee's bond.
Sanford v. Gilmnan (1877) 44 Conn. 461; see Hooker v. Goodwin (1917) 91
Conn. 463, 469, 99 AtI. 1059, 1061 (value of estate increased from $26,200
to $130,000 while in possession of life tenant). The Pennsylvania courts
have, however, as in the instant case, by a peculiar interpretation of their
statute, consistently held that a life tenant who posts a bond to secure the
remainderman, becomes not a trustee, but a debtor to the remainderman
for the value of the estate as of the date of the testator's death. n rc
Letterle (1915) 248 Pa. 95, 93 Atl. 935; Reiff's Appeal (1889) 124 Pa. 145,
16 Atl. 636; see 3 Woerner, op. cit. sec. 456. This rule protects the re-
mainderman in case the corpus decreases in value, but gives any increase
in value to the life tenant. In the instant case, this interpretation of the
statute was allowed to override the apparent intent of the testator that
the life tenant should act as trustee.
WORK-MEN'S CODMPENSATION-COMPUTTATION OF AwARD WHEN WORMIMAN
is KILLE DURING SUMMER EMPLOYENT.-The deceased was employed as
an instructor at a summer camp, receiving $200 for the twvo summer months.
In computing his average weekly wage-the basis of the award under N. Y.
Laws, 1922, ch. 615, sec. 14-the board added to the summer stipend the
salary he received during the other ten months of the year as a college
instructor and divided the sum by 52. Held, that this was error; that the
award was to be based on the defendant's actual earnings in the employ-
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ment in which he was injured, and if the employment was such that it
could be followed only during the summer months, then the $200 would
constitute for the purposes of the award the decedent's 'annual earnings
from which the weekly earnings must be computed-presumably by dividing
by 52. Kapler v. Camp Tagheonic (1926, App. Div. 3d Dept.) 213 N. Y.
Supp. 160.
The New York Workmen's Compensation Act provides for compensation
in proportion to the employee's earning capacity; and that earning capacity
is to be judged by the earnings "actually received in the employment in
which the injury occurs". N. Y. Laws, supra. The acts in other states
have similar provisions. Bradbury, Workmen's Compensation (2d ed.
1914) 746-765; In re Gagnon (1917) 228 Mass. 334, 117 N. E. 321. The
statutes expressly provide that the average salary of an employee in the
same or most similar employment, shall be the basis where the deceased
has not been engaged in the particular employment for a substantial part
of a year. Bradbury, loc. cit. Higher earning capacity as evidenced by
previous employment is immaterial. McDonald v. Iron Co. (1923, 3d Dept.)
206 App. Div. 571, 201 N. Y. Supp. 720. So also earnings in contempo-
raneous employment. West Salem v. Industrial Comm. (1916) 162 Wis.
57, 155 N. W. 929. But where an employee was hired jointly by several
employers, the total wage received was used in computing the award, rather
than the wage from the particular employer in whose work he was engaged
at the time of injury. Gillen v. Guarantee Corp. (1913) 215 Mass. 96,
102 N. E. 346. Where the work is continuous the weekly wage is computed
by dividing the annual earnings (average daily wage x 300) by 52 (weeks).
Bradbury, op. cit; Keast v. Steel Co. (1899) 15 T. L. R. 141 (amount
actually earned - 52). Or by dividing the amount earned by the number
of weeks employee actually worked. Insurance Co. v. Pillsbury (1916)
173 Calif. 56, 159 Pac. 150. But where the work was not continuous and
consumed veiy little of the employee's time, allowing him to work at other
employment, the weekly wage was computed by dividing the aggregate
wages earned by the number of weeks employed, including those in which
no work was done. State Road Comm. v. Industrial Comm. (1920) 56 Utah,
252, 190 Pac. 544. This same court, along with others, has held, however,
in the case of bricklayers, miners, and others whose work, although inter-
mittent and irregular, occupies a substantial part of the year, that the
weekly wage is derived by dividing the amount earned by the average
number of working weeks of th6 business. Littler v. Fuller Co. (1918)
223 N. Y. 369," 119 N. E. 554 (30 weeks); Utah Fuel v. Industrial Comm.
(1921) 59 Utah, 46, 201 Pac. 1034 (222 days). The court in the instant
case relied upon a dictum in the Littler case, supra, in reaching its decision.
The act does not expressly cover the instant case; and it is clearly dis-
tinguishable from any of the cases cited above, for here the employee works
full weeks for each employer, even though he divides his year between
them. But the purpose of the compensation acts is to make each employer
carry the hazards of his own business. See In re Gagnon, supra. It seems
obvious that the camp proprietor's business incurred for two months the
risk of injury to or death of an employee, earning approximately $25 per
week and the college incurred the same risk for the remaining ten months.
To cover those risks the college would pay a premium, other things being
equal, five times as great as the camp would pay-thus allotting the burden
as it should be and assuring to the employee compensation on the basis of
his actual weekly earning capacity. The court's construction makes it im-
possible for the employee to get compensation based on his actual weekly
earning capacity, whether the casualty occurs in the camp or the college.
The fractional nature of the present employer's risk is as to its duration
in time and not as to the weekly wages.
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